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The present research examined whether and how loading working memory can attenuate negative mood.
In three experiments, participants were exposed to neutral, weakly negative, or strongly negative pictures
followed by a task and a mood scale. Working memory demands were varied by manipulating task
presence (Study 1), complexity (Study 2), and predictability (Study 3). Participants in all three experi-
ments reported less negative moods in negative trials with high compared to low working memory
demand. Working memory demands did not affect mood in the neutral trials. When working memory
demands were high, participants no longer reported more negative moods in response to strongly negative
pictures than to weakly negative pictures. These findings suggest that loading working memory prevents
mood-congruent processing, and thereby promotes distraction from negative moods.
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Action seems to follow feeling, but really action and feeling go
together; and by regulating the action, which is under the more direct
control of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is not.
William James (1899, p. 500)
One of James’ important insights was that people’s actions and
feelings are closely intertwined. Although feelings often prompt
subsequent actions, actions influence feelings as well. For exam-
ple, when people feel frustrated after a long day at work, they may
exercise at the gym in order to feel better (Byrne & Byrne, 1993).
By studying outside of campus, students can prevent being lured
into the thrills and pleasures of student life (Fishbach & Shah,
2006). And by foregoing practice when feeling uncertain about
their performance, people can shield themselves against the dis-
appointment of failure (Jones & Berglas, 1978; Tice, 1991).
In the present research, we highlight an additional way in which
people’s actions may regulate their feelings. More specifically, we
investigate how actions that load working memory can distract
people from their negative moods. In the following paragraphs, we
begin by reviewing previous research on distraction from emotion.
Next, we suggest that a key aspect of distraction is the use of
limited processing capacity in working memory. The more work-
ing memory is being used by a distracting activity, the less room
will remain for negative moods to persist. To test this notion, we
present three experiments that analyzed the effectiveness of vary-
ing demands on working memory in distracting individuals from
negative mood. Notably, the present research focused on the
regulation of negative mood, because of its relevance to under-
standing mood disorders like chronic anxiety and depression
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000) and because regulation of negative mood
has received most attention in the emotion regulation literature
(Gross, 1998).
Distraction From Emotion
An act of distraction involves intentionally or unintentionally
drawing one’s attention away from a focal event. In the case of
mood regulation, a distracting activity draws the person’s attention
away from his or her mood, so that the person’s mood becomes
more neutral. As such, the concept of distraction plays an impor-
tant role in leading theories of emotion regulation (Bishop,
Duncan, & Lawrence, 2004; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998;
Trask & Sigmon, 1999).
Empirical research has confirmed that distraction can indeed
have an important influence on people’s moods. For example,
depressed individuals who are distracted from their dysphoric
mood states show alleviation of their depressive symptoms
(Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990).
Likewise, angry individuals who are distracted show reduced
anger (Gerin, Davidson, Christenfeld, Goyal, & Schwartz, 2006;
Rusting & Nolen–Hoeksema, 1998). Distraction can also decrease
individuals’ cardiovascular responses to negative mood (Gerin et
al., 1996; Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002).
Unfortunately, distraction may not always be that easy. People
often find it difficult to distract themselves from their negative
moods (Fiedler, Nickel, Asbeck, & Pagel, 2003; Josephson,
Singer, & Salovey, 1996; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993).
Indeed, many individuals engage in prolonged negative rumina-
tions when they would prefer to entertain more pleasant thoughts
(Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Kuhl,
1994; Martin & Tesser, 1996). These and other observations
suggest that distraction involves more than simply turning one’s
attention elsewhere. Additional processes may be needed before
distraction can be effective.
For distraction to be successful, people’s feelings may need to
be replaced by something else. In line with this idea, Morrow and
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Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) found that performing either motor
movements (i.e., walking back and forth to sort giant cards) or a
cognitive task both helped to distract participants from a previ-
ously induced depressive mood. However, the cognitive task was
more effective than the motor movements in neutralizing partici-
pants’ moods. To explain these findings, Morrow and
Nolen-Hoeksema suggested that participants could still ruminate
about their negative moods while they were moving about. Ac-
cordingly, the motor task might not have fully distracted partici-
pants from their mood states. By contrast, performing the cognitive
task required participants to generate task-related thoughts that
replaced mood-related thoughts. Thus, effective distraction may
involve replacing emotionally charged thoughts with more neutral
thoughts.
The differential effectiveness of various distracting activities
was further explored by Erber and Tesser (1992). These investi-
gators manipulated the amount of effort that participants invested
in distracting activities, such as solving math equations. Task
effort was manipulated by making investment in the task more or
less motivationally relevant to participants, or by varying the
complexity of the task. The results showed that distracting activ-
ities were more effective in neutralizing positive and negative
moods to the extent that participants invested high rather than low
effort in the distracting activity. Effortful cognitive activities are
thus more distracting than other types of activities, presumably
because effortful cognitive activities leave little room for mood
states to persist.
A Working Memory Model of Distraction
Through which mechanisms might effortful cognitive activities
prevent the continuation of negative moods? In the present article,
we suggest that working memory is a likely candidate. Working
memory is an assembly of structures and processes that is used for
temporarily storing and manipulating information in memory
(Baddeley, 1986). Because the capacity of working memory is
limited, different activities compete over its resources. The more
working memory capacity is used by one activity, the less can be
used by another concurrent activity. We suggest that the same
principle applies to mood-related processing. The more working
memory a person needs to perform a distracter task, the less
working memory will be left to maintain the person’s current
mood state.
Our working memory model of distraction from emotion as-
sumes that mood-congruent cognitions are an integral part of the
phenomenal experience of mood. This assumption has received
strong empirical support: Negative affective states evoke mood-
congruent cognitions (Blaney, 1986; Bower & Mayer, 1989;
Siemer, 2005), even after the original stimulus that caused this
state is no longer present (Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996).
People’s cognitions thus often serve to sustain, and even intensify
their initial negative affective response (Bradley et al., 1996;
Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Siegle,
Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). Indeed, in a recent
study, self-reported negative moods and mood-congruent cogni-
tions were found to operate in a strictly parallel fashion (Siemer,
2005). The prevention of mood-congruent cognitions is thus a
plausible mechanism that may underlie the effects of distraction.
This working memory account has important implications for
understanding how different task demands may influence distrac-
tion from negative mood. First, any changes in task demands
should distract from negative mood primarily to the extent that
these task demands implicate working memory capacity. Second,
the extent to which people use their working memory capacity can
vary dynamically from moment to moment (Ashcraft & Kirk,
2001; Jostmann & Koole, 2006). It thus follows that dynamic
changes in task demands can influence people’s mood states on a
moment-to-moment basis. Third, working memory capacity is a
continuous variable, such that working memory can be used at
low, medium, or high degrees (or take any intermediate value).
Accordingly, a working memory account implies that varying task
demands should have a linear effect on mood regulation. If a given
task requires much working memory capacity, then distraction
from negative mood should be relatively high. If a given task
requires intermediate amounts of working memory capacity, then
distraction from negative mood should be intermediate. If a given
task requires low working memory capacity, then distraction from
negative mood should be relatively low.
A more subtle but equally important implication of the present
account involves the impact of task demands on processing of
negative stimuli that vary in emotional intensity. Negative stimuli
are generally more attention-grabbing than neutral or positive
stimuli (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Pratto & John, 1991). This
processing advantage is stronger for strongly negative stimuli than
for mildly negative stimuli (Schimmack, 2005). Strongly negative
stimuli trigger more mood-congruent processing and, correspond-
ingly, employ more working memory capacity than mildly nega-
tive stimuli (see Klein & Boals, 2001, for empirical evidence). A
working memory account thus predicts an interaction between task
demands and emotional intensity of negative stimuli. Distracter
tasks that occupy working memory capacity may exert a greater
influence on emotional processing of strongly rather than weakly
negative stimuli.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
In the present research, we sought to test some of the predictions
of the working memory model of distraction from negative mood.
In three experiments, participants were presented with a series of
neutral and negative pictures that varied in affective intensity.
After viewing each picture, participants performed either a more or
a less demanding task (or no task) and then reported their moods.
Accordingly, the present research examined the role of distraction
on moment-to-moment mood changes.
In Study 1, we investigated the effect of task presence and exposure
to strong versus weak negative pictures on participants’ moods. In line
with a working memory model of distraction, we expected the inten-
sity of negative mood reports to decrease when working memory load
of a subsequent task would increase. Strongly negative pictures can be
presumed to have a greater impact on working memory than mildly
negative pictures (Schimmack, 2005). We therefore expected that a
demanding task would attenuate participants’ negative moods to a
greater degree in response to strongly rather than mildly negative
pictures.
Our main goal in Study 2 was to establish whether distraction
depends on the amount of working memory capacity being used by
the task, and not only on the redirection of attention away from the
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affective stimulus and toward the task. To this end, we experimen-
tally varied the complexity of the distracting task by having
participants solve both simple and more complex equations. In this
way, we manipulated the amount of information to be held in
working memory. In addition, we wanted to replicate the interac-
tion between task demands and emotional intensity of negative
stimuli. We thus expected complex tasks to have a greater impact
on further processing of strongly negative stimuli than on further
processing of weakly negative stimuli.
In Study 3, we wanted to vary working memory load while
keeping qualitative task parameters constant. Therefore, we varied
working memory load by manipulating both the presence and the
predictability of the math task. When a task is unpredictable,
people cannot rely on already activated knowledge structures from
long-term memory. Consequently, more working memory capacity
has to be allocated to unpredictable tasks than to predictable tasks
(Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001). We predicted a linear
effect of working memory load on distraction from negative mood:
The more working memory capacity is used to perform a task, the
less is used for mood-related processing, and thus the more a
previously induced mood should decrease. Predictable math tasks
were hence expected to induce more distraction than no task, and
unpredictable math tasks were expected to induce more distraction
than predictable math tasks.
Study 1
Study 1 provided an initial investigation of the influence of
working memory processes on moment-to-moment mood changes.
Participants were presented with neutral or negative pictures, fol-
lowed by either a math task or no task, upon which participants
reported their moods. We expected participants to experience less
intense negative moods in negative trials with a task, than in
negative trials without a task. Moreover, because the math task
was assumed to interfere with mood-congruent processing, we
expected that the math task would not influence mood during
neutral trials. Finally, we examined whether affective intensity and
task presence would interact, as expected by a working memory
account of distraction. We thus predicted that mood ratings after
strongly negative pictures would be more attenuated by perform-
ing a distracting task than mood ratings after mildly negative
pictures.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-eight paid volunteers at the
Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam (12 men and 26 women; aver-
age age  22 years) took part in the experiment. The experimental
design was 2 (math task: no task vs. math task; within partici-
pants) 3 (picture negativity: neutral, mildly negative, or strongly
negative; within participants). The main dependent variables con-
sisted of participants’ negative mood ratings and their math per-
formance.
Procedure and equipment. Upon arrival in the laboratory,
participants were led to individual cubicles with a personal com-
puter. The experimenter explained that the remaining instructions
would be administered via a computer-program and left. After a
brief introduction and filling out some personality questionnaires,
participants proceeded with a picture-viewing task. During this
task, participants were presented with either neutral or negative
pictures. These pictures had been selected from the International
Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001).
Based on published normative valence ratings (ranging on a scale
of 1 [most unpleasant] to 9 [most pleasant]), we selected two sets
of 60 pictures, namely a negative set (valence ratings under 2.50)
and a neutral set (valence ratings between 4.00 and 5.00). The
negative pictures were further divided into two categories of either
strong negative valence (30 pictures with normative IAPS scores
lower than 2.2) or mild negative valence (30 pictures with norma-
tive IAPS scores of 2.2 and higher). In this way, we investigated
whether the affective intensity of the pictures would differentially
impact mood ratings in trials with, and without a task. Negative
pictures included images of scenes with burn victims, physical
assaults, and angry faces. Neutral pictures depicted scenes of
people in conversation, scenes of nature or buildings, household
objects, and neutral faces.
The picture viewing task consisted of 120 trials. During each
trial, a negative or neutral picture appeared on screen for 4 sec-
onds. During half of the trials, participants also had to solve a math
task after viewing the picture. In between the picture and the math
task, an announcement of the math task was displayed on the
screen for one second. The math task consisted of a moderately
complex equation, such as “2*8  12  28.” Each equation
combined a summation or subtraction with a product or a division.
Participants judged whether the equation was correct by a key-
board response. Participants had 4 seconds to make this response.
Both participants’ responses and their response times were re-
corded. At the end of each trial, participants rated, with a keyboard
response, how unpleasant they felt at that moment on a nine-point
scale (1  not at all to 9  very much). In between trials,
participants were asked to relax for 4 seconds. Before the 120
experimental trials, participants first received four practice trials to
become familiar with the task. After the picture-viewing task,
participants were thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and paid by
the experimenter.
Results
Math performance. A 3 (picture negativity) analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) showed no effect of picture negativity on partic-
ipants’ correct responses, F(2, 36)  1, or on participants’ re-
sponse times, F(2, 36)  1.76, ns.
Mood. We only analyzed the correct trials (74%) to rule out
possible influences of erroneous responding on participants’ neg-
ative mood ratings. For instance, giving a wrong response might
increase participants’ negative moods. Throughout Studies 1–3,
analyses of all trials or the incorrect trials did however not yield
any differential results. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.
To analyze participants moods, we conducted a 2 (task)  3
(picture negativity) ANOVA of participants’ mood ratings. This
analysis yielded a main effect of picture negativity: F(2, 36) 
69.56, p  .001. As expected, contrast analyses revealed a
linear effect of picture negativity, F(1, 37)  134.52, p  .001,
such that participants reported most negative moods after
strongly negative pictures (M  4.67), less negative moods
after mildly negative pictures (M  4.44) and the least negative
moods after neutral pictures (M  2.56).
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The ANOVA further yielded the predicted interaction between
task and picture negativity, F(2, 36)  28.60, p  .001. We
proceeded by analyzing the effect of task separately for each
picture negativity condition. Analysis of the neutral pictures
yielded no effect of task, F(1, 37) 1.21, ns. We therefore focused
our further analyses solely on the negative trials. In the negative
trials, the analyses produced an effect of task for both the strongly
negative, as well as the mildly negative trials (F(1, 37)  60.35,
p  .001 and F(1, 37)  38.92, p  .001, respectively). These
effects indicate that, across both strongly and mildly negative
trials, participants reported less negative moods in negative trials
with a task, than in negative trials without a task.
Another valid way to interpret the picture negativity by task
interaction in the negative trials is to consider the effect of picture
negativity separately for each task condition. This analysis yielded
an effect for picture negativity in the negative trials without a task
F(1, 37)  28.45, p  .001. In these trials, participants reported
significantly less intense negative moods following mildly nega-
tive pictures (M  4.83) than following strongly negative pictures
(M 5.32). There was, however, no effect of picture negativity on
negative mood in trials with a task, F(1, 37)  .13, ns. (M  4.01
and M  4.07, respectively for mildly vs. strongly negative pic-
tures). Thus, strongly negative pictures only elicited more negative
moods than mildly negative pictures in trials without a math task.
In trials with a math task, strongly and weakly negative pictures
induced equal amounts of negative mood.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 showed the predicted effects of task
presence on moment-to moment ratings of negative mood. In line
with a working memory model, participants reported less negative
moods after negative pictures followed by a math task than when
negative pictures were not followed by a task. Performing a math
task did not influence participants’ moods during neutral trials.
Also in line with a working memory model, performing a math
task interacted with the intensity of the negative pictures. Specif-
ically, participants’ moods after strongly negative pictures were
more attenuated by performing a math task than moods after
mildly negative pictures. Indeed, when a task was present, mood
ratings after strongly negative pictures no longer differed from
mood ratings after mildly negative pictures. This is in line with the
idea that strongly negative pictures have a greater impact on
working memory capacity than mildly negative pictures, so that
the processing of these pictures should be affected more by addi-
tional working memory demands.
Study 2
Although the results of Study 1 fit with a working memory
model of distraction, Study 1 only manipulated the presence or
absence of a demanding task. As such, it is hard to say whether the
effects of task presence on negative mood resulted from variations
in processing capacity, as our analysis suggests, or whether these
effects resulted merely from an attentional shift away from the
current mood state. We conducted Study 2 to address this ambi-
guity.
In Study 2, participants solved a math equation in each trial. To
vary involvement of working memory, we manipulated task com-
plexity during the different trials. In half of the trials, neutral and
negative pictures were followed by the same math equations as in
Study 1. In the remaining trials, pictures were followed by much
simpler equations. Previous research has found that complex math
tasks make greater demands on working memory capacity than
simple math tasks (Ashcraft, Donley, Halas & Vakali, 1992). Thus,
if the effects of the math tasks in Study 1 were due to their
differential demands on working memory capacity, distraction
from negative moods should be greater after performing complex
rather than simple math tasks. On the other hand, if the results of
Study 1 were due mainly to a shift in attention away from the
negative mood state, performing complex and simple math tasks
should induce similar levels of distraction from negative moods.
Study 2 again examined whether picture negativity and task
presence would interact. As in Study 1, we predicted that mood
ratings after strongly negative pictures would be more attenuated
by task complexity than mood ratings after mildly negative pic-
tures.
Method
Participants and design. Thirty-nine paid volunteers at the
Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam (7 men and 32 women; average
age  20 years) took part in the experiment. The experimental
design was 2 (task complexity: simple vs. complex)  3 (picture
negativity: neutral, mildly negative, or strongly negative), both
factors within participants. The main dependent variables con-
sisted of participants’ negative mood ratings and their math per-
formance.
Procedure and equipment. The procedure of Study 2 was
similar to Study 1. Participants again performed the picture-
viewing task. This time, all pictures were followed by a math task.
The complexity of the math task was varied experimentally. In half
of the trials, the math task consisted of an equation similar to the
moderately complex equations used in Study 1, such as “2*8 
12  28.” Each of these equations always combined a summation
or subtraction with a product or a division. In the remaining trials,
the math task consisted of a much simpler equation, such as “7 
2  9.” Each of these equations only consisted of either a sum-
mation or a subtraction.
Results
Math performance. A 2 (task complexity)  3 (picture nega-
tivity) ANOVA revealed a main effect for task complexity, F(1,
Table 1
Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and
Task (Study 1)
Picture negativity
Task Neutral Mild Strong
Absent 2.58a (1.13) 4.82b (1.64) 5.32c (1.84)
Present 2.55a (1.17) 4.06d (1.47) 4.01d (1.59)
Note. SD in parentheses. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much). Means that do not share subscripts differ within rows and columns
at p  .05.
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38)  234.41, p  .001. This effect can be seen as a manipulation
check. Participants performed better on the simple math trials than
on the complex math trials (M  96% correct vs. M  70%
correct), irrespective of picture negativity. Participants were also
faster on the simple math equations than on the complex math
equations, F(1, 38)  1770.78, p  .001 (M  1932 vs. M 
3021).
Negative mood. We analyzed negative mood ratings in a 2
(task complexity)  3 (picture negativity) ANOVA. Relevant
means are displayed in Table 2. In this analysis, we again only
used affect ratings of the correctly answered math-trials (83% of
all responses). The analysis revealed a main effect of picture
negativity on participants’ mood ratings: F(2, 37)  52.05, p 
.001. As expected, contrast analyses revealed a linear effect of
picture negativity, F(1, 37)  134.52, p  .001, such that partic-
ipants reported most negative moods after strongly negative pic-
tures (M  4.67), less negative moods after mildly negative
pictures (M  4.44), and the least negative moods after neutral
pictures (M  2.56).
The ANOVA further yielded the predicted interaction between
task complexity and picture negativity, F(2, 37)  13.62, p 
.001. We again did not find an effect of task complexity in the
neutral trials, F  1. To better understand the interaction, we
proceeded by analyzing the negative trials (mildly vs. strongly
negative). We first analyzed the effects of task complexity sepa-
rately in each negativity condition. These analyses did not yield a
significant effect of task complexity in the mildly negative trials,
F(1, 38)  2.64, ns. Nevertheless, at a descriptive level, partici-
pants did report less negative moods in response to mildly negative
pictures followed by a complex task (M  3.97) rather than a
simple task (M 4.16). By contrast, the analyses revealed a highly
significant effect for task complexity in the strongly negative trials,
F(1, 38)  29.13, p  .001. Participants reported less negative
moods after strongly negative pictures followed by a complex
math equation rather than a simple math equation (M  3.92 vs.
M  4.71).
As in Study 1, we then considered the effect of picture nega-
tivity (mildly vs. strongly negative) separately for each task con-
dition. In the negative trials with a simple task, the analysis yielded
an effect for picture valence, F(1, 38)  21.05, p  .001. In trials
containing a simple task, participants reported more negative
moods following strongly negative pictures than following mildly
negative pictures (M  4.71 vs. M  4.16). By contrast, in
negative trials with a complex task, there was no effect of picture
valence on participants’ negative moods, F(1, 38)  1. In trials
containing a complex task, participants reported as much negative
mood in response to strongly negative pictures as in response to
mildly negative pictures (M  3.97 vs. M  3.92).
Recall that we found an effect of task complexity on partici-
pants’ response times. To rule out that differences in task duration
could explain the effect of task complexity on negative mood
ratings in the negative trials, we therefore repeated our analyses
with participant’s response time difference between the complex
and the simple trials as a covariate. A 2 (task complexity) analysis
of covariance (ANCOVA) analysis of the negative mood ratings in
the negative trials still revealed a strong effect for task complexity,
F(1, 38)  27.07, p  .001. Moreover, when entered as a covari-
ate, response time differences were unable to account for the
effects of task complexity on negative moods, F(1, 37)  1.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 replicate and extend Study 1. Because
each trial now contained a math task, we could investigate the
impact of varying working memory load on negative mood. In line
with predictions, participants reported less negative moods after
strongly negative pictures followed by a complex task than after
strongly negative pictures followed by a simple task. Participants
also reported somewhat less negative moods in response to mildly
negative pictures followed by a complex rather than a simple task.
However, the latter effect of task load did not reach statistical
significance. Thus, while an increase in task load resulted in a
decrease in mood ratings across both strongly and mildly negative
pictures, this decrease was much smaller for mildly negative
pictures. This is in line with the assumption that an increase in
working memory load should have a greater impact on additional
processing of strongly negative stimuli than on additional process-
ing of weakly negative stimuli. These findings thus further support
our working memory model of distraction from negative mood.
A possible confound in Studies 1 and 2, however, was task
duration. As the results showed, participants took less time to solve
simple equations than to solve complex equations. Although the
effects of task complexity remained unchanged when we statisti-
cally controlled for this difference, we cannot rule out the possi-
bility that qualitative differences between the two types of equa-
tions, other than their complexity, impacted participants’ moods.
This problem could not simply be resolved by using shorter
timeframes, because doing so might make the complex task too
difficult, and thereby undermine participants’ motivation to invest
effort in the task. We therefore took another approach in Study 3
to address this problem.
Study 3
In Study 3, we varied the predictability of the complex math task
that was used as a distraction, while keeping all other task param-
eters constant. Unannounced or novel stimuli make greater de-
mands on central executive resources, and thus on working mem-
ory (Baddeley et al., 2001; Spector & Biederman, 1976). In this
regard, it is important to note that, in our experiments, participants
had limited time (4 seconds) to perform the math task. Even
though one can argue that in absolute terms, announced and
unannounced math tasks require the same amount of working
memory, announced math tasks entail working memory earlier, but
Table 2
Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and
Task Complexity (Study 2)
Picture negativity
Task Neutral Mild Strong
Simple 2.61a (1.00) 4.16b (1.26) 4.71c (1.43)
Complex 2.66a (1.12) 3.97bd (1.31) 3.92d (1.38)
Note. SD in parentheses. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much). Means that do not share subscripts differ within rows and columns
at p  .05.
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more evenly distributed over time. Unannounced math tasks under
a time limit on the other hand, “pull up” all required working
memory at once, thus making a much greater demand on total WM
capacity at one moment. Unexpected tasks should hence be more
potent distracters from negative mood than expected tasks. An
important advantage of this approach was that, because the actual
task was always the same, this ruled out possible confounding
factors due to qualitative differences between tasks.
Another advantage of varying task predictability was that we
could examine the linearity of the effect of task load on negative
mood. We manipulated task predictability by randomly presenting
trials without a task, trials with an announced task, and with a
sudden task. On the basis of our working memory model of
distraction from negative mood, we expected participants to report
least negative moods in the negative trials with a sudden task (high
load), intermediate negative moods in the negative trials with an
announced task (intermediate load), and most negative moods in
negative trials without a task (no load).
Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, we predicted that higher task load
would interfere especially with the further processing of strongly
negative pictures. We therefore expected that strongly negative
pictures would induce more negative moods than mildly negative
pictures especially in trials where working memory load was low,
or absent, such as in the trials with the announced task or no task.
By contrast, we predicted that strongly negative pictures would
induce equally negative moods as mildly negative pictures in trials
where working memory load was high, such as in the trials with
the sudden math task.
Method
Participants and design. Forty paid volunteers at the Vrije Uni-
versiteit van Amsterdam (12 men and 28 women; average age  20
years) took part in the experiment. The experimental design was 3
(task type: sudden, announced, or no task)  3 (picture negativity:
neutral, mildly negative, and strongly negative), both within partici-
pants. The main dependent variables consisted of participants’ math
performance and their negative affect ratings.
Procedure and equipment. The procedure was similar as in
Studies 1 and 2. This time, one third of the neutral and negative
pictures were followed by a sudden math task, one third by an
announced math task, while the remaining pictures were not followed
by a math task. To announce the math task, the word “som,” which is
Dutch for “calculation,” was displayed on screen one second before
the task appeared. In this way, we experimentally varied the predict-
ability of the math task. The math task following two thirds of the
pictures consisted of equations similar to the equations used in Study
1 and the complex equations used in Study 2.
Results
Math performance. A 3 (task type)  3 (picture negativity)
ANOVA revealed a main effect for task type on math performance,
F(2, 38) 40.98, p .001. Participants gave more correct responses
in the announced math trials than in the unannounced math trials
(M 73%; M 65%). The analyses revealed no effect for task type
on response times. Thus, participants solved the announced math
tasks equally quickly as the unannounced math tasks, F(2, 38) 1.55,
ns, (M  2,474 vs. M  2,534, respectively).
Negative mood. We analyzed participants’ negative mood rat-
ings in a 3 (task type)  3 (picture negativity) ANOVA for
repeated measures. In this analysis, we again only used affect
ratings of the correctly answered math-trials (79% of all re-
sponses). Relevant means are displayed in Table 3. The analysis
yielded a main effect for picture negativity: F(2, 38)  70.40, p 
.001. The analysis further yielded the expected interaction between
picture negativity and task type, F(4, 36)  4.26, p  .01.
In order to understand these effects, we proceeded by analyzing
the effect of picture negativity and task type separately using linear
contrast analyses. As in Studies 1 and 2, these analyses yielded a
linear effect for picture negativity, F(1, 39)  125.46, p  .001.
Participants reported more negative moods after strongly negative
pictures than after mildly negative pictures (M  4.96 vs. M 
4.52) and least negative moods after neutral pictures (M  2.94).
Furthermore, in line with our predictions, there was a linear
effect for task type for both the strongly negative, as well as the
mildly negative trials (F(1, 39)  19.46, p  .001 and F(1, 39) 
33.19, p  .001, respectively). Thus, participants’ negative moods
linearly decreased as working memory load increased, irrespective
of the intensity of the negative pictures. As in Studies 1 and 2, we
did not find a linear effect for task type on the mood ratings in the
neutral trials F(1, 39)  2.01, ns Accordingly, we restricted our
further analyses exclusively to the negative trials.
Next, we considered the effect of picture negativity (mildly vs.
strongly negative) separately by task type. This analysis revealed
a significant effect for picture negativity on the negative mood
ratings in trials containing an announced task, F(1, 39)  21.30,
p .001, and trials without a task, F(1, 39) 29.40, p .001. By
contrast, there was no effect for picture negativity on the mood
ratings in the trials containing the unannounced task, F(1, 39) 1.
Thus, when trials contained an announced task, or no task, partic-
ipants reported significantly less negative mood after mildly neg-
ative pictures (M 4.52 vs. M 4.78 for announced, and no tasks
respectively) than after strongly negative pictures (M  5.12 vs.
M  5.35 for announced, and no tasks respectively). In negative
trials with an unannounced task, however, participants’ negative
moods after strongly negative pictures (M  4.40) did not differ
significantly from their moods after mildly negative pictures (M
4.26).
Discussion
In Study 3, we manipulated working memory load by varying
task predictability, while the actual task was always the same.
Table 3
Mean Negative Mood as a Function of Picture Negativity and
Task Type (Study 3)
Picture negativity
Task Type Neutral Mild Strong
No task 3.09a (1.55) 4.78b (1.73) 5.35d (1.94)
Announced task 2.88a (1.32) 4.52c (1.83) 5.12e (1.94)
Sudden task 2.92a (1.27) 4.26f (1.70) 4.40f (1.73)
Note. SD in parentheses. Ratings ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very
much). Means that do not share subscripts differ within rows and columns
at p  .05.
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In this way, Study 3 controlled for qualitative differences
between tasks such as duration. As expected, working memory
load had a linear effect on participants’ negative mood ratings.
Participants reported more negative moods after negative pic-
tures without a subsequent task (no load) than after negative
pictures followed by an announced task (intermediate load),
while they reported even less negative moods in trials with an
unannounced task (high load). Moreover, in the trials with a
sudden math task, participants reported as much negative
moods after strongly negative pictures as after mildly negative
pictures. In the trials with an announced math task or no task,
participants reported more negative moods after strongly neg-
ative pictures than after mildly negative pictures. Apparently,
when task load was high, strongly negative pictures no longer
elicited more mood-related processing than mildly negative
pictures.
General Discussion
In the present research, we proposed that people can distract
themselves from negative moods by loading their working
memory capacity. In line with this model, three experiments
showed that variations in working memory load moderate the
impact of viewing negative pictures on mood. Participants
reported less negative moods after viewing negative pictures
when they had to solve complex math problems rather than no
math problems (Study 1) or simple math problems (Study 2).
The moderating effect of math problems on negative mood was
stronger for unannounced math problems, which presumably
use more working memory capacity (Spector & Biederman,
1976), than for announced math problems (Study 3). Solving
math problems had no effect on mood after participants viewed
neutral pictures (Studies 1–3). Finally, solving math problems
had a stronger moderating impact on negative mood when
participants had viewed strongly rather than mildly negative
pictures (Studies 1–3). The latter findings fit well with a work-
ing memory model, given that strongly negative stimuli use
greater working memory capacity than mildly negative stimuli
(Schimmack, 2005).
The present studies show that distraction from negative mood
involves more than simply redirecting one’s attention away
from the emotional stimulus. However, we do not mean to say
that attention is irrelevant to distraction from negative mood.
Processes of selective attention are critical for the operation of
working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). This can be illustrated by the way
we manipulated working memory in our research, namely by
varying the complexity or the predictability of a distracter task.
When performing a simple or predictable task, people can rely
on more habitual processes, such that attention can still shift to
mood-related information. When people are confronted with a
more complex, or unexpected task, however, people can no
longer rely on habitual processes, but instead need to focus their
full attention on the task (Baddeley, 1998; Norman & Shallice,
1980).
The present findings fit well with neuropsychological findings
about the interaction of higher cognitive mechanisms for attention
and controlled processing with (lower limbic) regions involved in
emotional processing (Cohen, Lohr, Paul, & Boland, 2001;
Drevets & Raichle, 1998; Mayberg et al., 1999). For example,
participants, when they had to judge emotional pictures on some
nonvalenced criteria, namely picture format, displayed less in-
volvement of limbic regions while watching the affective pictures,
than when they had to judge the pictures’ valence, or had to
indicate if the pictures evoked any feelings (Northoff et al., 2004).
Increased involvement of the cognitive system may thus lead to a
decreased involvement of the emotional system (Hariri, Bookhei-
mer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Northoff et al., 2004), and vice versa
(Bishop et al., 2004; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Mitchell, Richell,
Leonard, & Blair, 2006).
It is informative to compare distraction with suppression of
emotional thoughts, another well-established emotion regula-
tion strategy (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; Wenzlaff, Wegner &
Roper, 1988). In both strategies, people alter their emotional
states by preventing emotion-related cognitions to enter aware-
ness. However, during emotional thought suppression, the ac-
tive inhibition of emotional thoughts may actually make
emotion-related material more accessible (Howell & Conway,
1992; Wenzlaff et al., 1988), resulting in mood rebounds (Weg-
ner et al., 1993; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). Because distraction
does not require the active suppression of emotional thoughts,
it should not result in mood rebounds. In support of this,
research has shown that when people were distracted following
a negative mood induction, subsequent rumination did not again
deteriorate their moods. When people however ruminated im-
mediately after the negative mood induction, their negative
mood states persisted (Trask & Sigmon, 1999).
Although distraction seems a relatively efficient emotion regu-
lation strategy, it may not necessarily be the most optimal ap-
proach under all circumstances. First, for a distracter task to be
effective, it should not elicit negative feelings by itself. Ashcraft
and Kirk (2001), for example, demonstrated that people high on
math-anxiety performed more poorly on a math task than people
low on math anxiety, because anxious thoughts incorporated work-
ing memory capacity and thus interfered with efficient task per-
formance. For people high on math anxiety then, the math task no
longer functioned as a neutral cognitive distracter, but as a nega-
tive affective stimulus in itself, producing negative feelings instead
of replacing them with neutral thoughts. Low emotionality of the
distracter task is therefore an important boundary condition for
distraction from negative mood.
Second, distraction may not be the most effective way to
resolve more structural causes of negative mood, such as for
example problematic relationships, or difficulties at work. This
is because distraction leaves the source of the negative emotion
itself intact. In highly distressing situations, it may be helpful to
distract oneself initially, in order to step back and put things in
perspective. In the end, however, distraction is no substitute for
problem solving. For example, workaholics often explain their
excessive work habits by stating that it helps them forget about
problems in their private life (Robinson, 2001). At the same
time, there exists an inverse relationship between marital sat-
isfaction and obsessive working in the research literature
(Matthews, Conger, & Wickrama, 1996; Robinson, 2001). In
these and related instances, distraction from negative mood may
actually contribute to a vicious cycle of maladaptive behavior.
Identifying the costs and benefits of distraction from negative
mood clearly constitutes an important task for future research.
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Limitations and Future Perspectives
The present research demonstrates how increasing working
memory load of a distracter task may attenuate negative mood. It
is not clear however, whether the model also applies to distraction
from positive mood. Recent studies in our lab, using a similar
paradigm as the present studies, failed to find an effect of working
memory load on positive mood (Van Dillen & Koole, 2006;
though see Erber & Tesser, 1992). As such, distraction from
positive mood may not operate according to the same principles as
distraction from negative mood. It is conceivable that positive
emotional stimuli may impact cognitive processes through a dif-
ferent route that negative emotional stimuli (Isen, 2002). For
example, positive emotional states do not always result in mood-
congruent processing (Fiedler et al., 2003), and can increase both
cognitive flexibility (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005), as well as distract-
ibility (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Clearly, the question how
distraction from positive mood may operate deserves more atten-
tion in future research.
Although the present research demonstrated that distraction can
attenuate negative moods in response to negative pictures, dis-
tracted participants still reported less negative moods in response
to neutral pictures. Physiological responses to emotional stimuli
take several minutes to return to baseline, even when people are
distracted (Glynn et al., 2002). These physiological responses may
thus continue to impact participants’ negative mood after four
seconds, the interval we used between the picture display and the
mood scale. Extending this interval from several seconds to several
minutes may effectively reduce negative mood to neutral levels. In
line with this, Erber and Tesser (1992) found a complete neutral-
ization of negative mood when participants solved moderately
complex math equations for 10 minutes after the mood induction.
The exact relationship between the duration and the effectiveness
of distraction from negative moods represents a fruitful topic for
future inquiry.
Future work is also needed to clarify the effects of type of
working memory load on distraction from emotion. Baddeley and
colleagues (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) proposed that working mem-
ory consisted of two storage buffers (the phonological loop for
verbal information and the visuospatial sketchpad for nonverbal
information), which are assumed to be relatively independent. For
example, anxiety has been shown to have a disproportionate effect
on verbal working memory while leaving visuospatial working
memory performance (implicated in nonverbal working memory)
unaffected (Ikeda, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 1996). Thus, verbalization
of mood-related information seems to interfere particularly with
verbal working memory (Gray, 2001). Further research should
address whether a distracter task that implicates a different work-
ing memory device than mood-related processing still results in
attenuation of negative moods.
Concluding Remarks
In everyday life, the effectiveness of distraction from negative
mood is widely recognized, given that people are often advised to
“move on” when in a negative state by seeking out alternative
activities. Nevertheless, distraction is typically used as an explan-
atory construct rather than as a phenomenon that needs to be
explained. In the present research, we sought to deepen our un-
derstanding of the underlying mechanisms of distraction from
negative mood by proposing a working memory model. By loading
working memory, people can attenuate the impact of negative
events on their moods. Thus, in keeping with William James’ early
observations on the close interplay between actions and feelings,
the present research highlights distraction as one important type of
action through which people may regulate their feelings.
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